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Abstract
We study zero-sum repeated games where the minimizing player has to pay a certain cost
each time he changes his action. Our contribution is twofold. First, we show that the
value of the game exists in stationary strategies, depending solely on the previous action
of the minimizing player, not the entire history. We provide a full characterization of
the value and the optimal strategies. The strategies exhibit a robustness property and
typically do not change with a small perturbation of the switching costs. Second, we
consider a case where the minimizing player is limited to playing simpler strategies that
are completely history-independent. Here too, we provide a full characterization of the
(minimax) value and the strategies for obtaining it. Moreover, we present several bounds
on the loss due to this limitation.
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1 Introduction
No time instance is an island. Past decisions typically affect the present, either by changing
the set of available actions, changing the payoff associated with them or simply through the
inertia that makes changing actions costly. For example, consider a guard patrolling among
several remote warehouses. Whenever he reaches a warehouse, staying there is costless, while
continuing the patrol and moving to another location incurs costs (e.g. fuel). Hence, his
optimal route depends on the fuel costs and if these are high enough, he might significantly
reduce his movements and choose to stay in a single location most of the time.
Switching costs (or “menu costs” [Akerlof and Yellen, 1985a,b]) appear naturally in differ-
ent economic settings, such as markets [Beggs and Klemperer, 1992] and bargaining [Caruana et al.,
2007]. They can reflect the real cost of changing one’s action (costs of setting up machin-
ery to increase production, shut-down costs of reducing production and adapting machinery
from one production line to another) or be a method of modeling bounded rationality when
changing actions might be “hard” [Lipman and Wang, 2000, 2009]. In a management quality
context, switching costs can be related to changing a company policy or marketing strategy.
In these examples, the underlying game is a non-zero-sum game and the addition of switching
costs creates new opportunities for the players to cooperate to increase their payoffs. This
occurs when the switching costs either eliminate existing equilibria (without switching costs)
with low payoffs or turn a Pareto-optimal strategy profile into an equilibrium, such as the
cooperative strategy profile in the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma (even the finitely repeated
one, see Lipman and Wang [2000, 2009]). On the other hand, switching costs might impede
punishments by making switching to a punishment strategy costly.
To the best of our knowledge, apart from studies focused on specific games (such as the
Blotto game in Shy [2019]), switching costs have never been thoroughly addressed theoret-
ically in the setting of repeated normal-form zero-sum games. Schoenmakers et al. [2008]
studied an equivalent zero-sum model, in which a constant bonus is granted each time the
previous action is not changed. In this paper, we generalize their work1 to non-constant
switching costs, discuss how optimal strategies can be approximated using simpler strategies,
and study limit cases of small and large switching costs (compared to the payoffs of the game)
and action-independent switching costs. In addition, we extend the comparison of stationary
and simpler strategies to a more general class of stochastic games than that derived from
adding switching costs to a normal-form zero-sum game.
1Receiving a bonus for repeating an action is equivalent to paying a fine for not repeating the action. Thus,
up to an additive constant, their model is equivalent to a private case of our model studied in Section 3.4.
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Our model. We consider a repeated normal-form zero-sum game. At each time step, the
minimizing player pays the maximizing player both the “standard” outcome of the game
and an additional fine if he switched his previous action (the maximizing player incurs no
switching costs). This fits situations where the minimizing player performs a worst-case
analysis and assumes that the other player is an adversary benefiting from any loss of his
utility. For example, the security guard can assume that the opponent is an adversary that
benefiting from all his losses, including fuel costs. A similar assumption is made when both
players have switching costs that are paid to the “bank” rather than to each other. In this
case, which is no longer zero-sum, when the minimax value of each player is calculated, the
switching costs of the other players play no role. We leave for future research the analysis of
situations where both players have switching costs that are paid to each other, or the study
of equilibria in models where the switching costs are paid to a “bank”.
Unlike the models most closely resembling ours, Schoenmakers et al. [2008] and Lipman and Wang
[2009], we allow the switching costs to depend on the action. For the patrolling guard ex-
ample, this captures the idea that there may be different costs involved in reaching different
locations, based on distance and topography. We assume that there is a multiplicative factor
c applied to the switching costs. When we increase this factor, the switching costs increase,
while the ratio between the costs of two different switches remains the same (an increase in
fuel costs increases the cost of movement between warehouses without changing the distances
between them). By changing factor c, therefore, we can study how the value of the game and
the optimal strategies change when the switching costs change uniformly, without affecting
the internal structure of the costs.
Applications. Our model fits different real-life situations. In the security guard example
(which is in fact an analogy to a cyber-security problem, see Liuzzi et al. [2020]), the attacker
benefits both from attacking a warehouse and from causing the defender disutility due to his
defensive efforts. In Schoenmakers et al. [2008], the switching costs represent short-term
learning, so changing from one action to another is costly in that it disregards the learning
from the previous stage. For a non-zero-sum game, our model can be applied to calculate the
reservation payoff of each player, i.e., the minimum payoff he can guarantee for himself when
his switching costs are taken into account. The reader can find more examples of zero-sum
and non-zero-sum games in papers such as Lipman and Wang [2000, 2009].
The additive nature of the payoffs naturally becomes a factor when dealing with multi-
objective minimization. Rass and Rainer [2014] proved that any equilibrium in a game with
multiple objectives is a minimax strategy in a game with a single objective, where the payoff
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function is some weighted average of all the objective functions. Hence, if the minimizing
player wishes to minimize both his “regular” payoff in the repeated game and his switching
costs, an alternative approach is to consider a game where the two are weighted and summed,
as in our model.
Finally, in our model, the players have undiscounted payoffs. This is typical of cyber-
security, where the number of stages played over a short time (hours) is very large. The
cybersecurity literature has a variety of reasons for looking at games with switching costs.
For example, Liuzzi et al. [2020] mention how changing passwords is costly. They also point
out that the patrolling game example can be generalized to other moving target defenses:
for example, changing the configuration of a computer system where costs could include
downtime of servers and hourly rates of staff. Zhu and Başar [2013] mention, amongst many
other examples, the deceptive routing game where a defense strategy misleads a jammer into
attacking legitimate routes by deploying fake routes in wireless communication networks.
Optimal strategies. A game with switching costs is equivalent to a stochastic game
[Shapley, 1953] where the states correspond to the previous action taken by the minimizing
player. Since this game is a single-controller stochastic game (only he controls the states),
there should be an optimal strategy that is stationary (depends solely on the state and not the
time) and can be computed using one of several standard tools (see for example the technique
in Appendix A, as well as Filar [1980], Stern [1975], Raghavan [2003], Raghavan and Syed
[2002] and others). In practice, however, such an approach suffers from two disadvantages.
First, if in the original game the player has n pure actions, a stationary strategy in the
stochastic game assigns a mixed action to each state, which yields n2 ´ n decision variables.
This poses a computational challenge that leads to the introduction of new simpler strategies,
at the expense of some payoff. Second, in some applications such as cybersecurity, there is an
additional requirement that the mixed actions of the minimizing player (defender) should be
the same for every state [Rass et al., 2017, Wachter et al., 2018]. We therefore also consider
strategies that satisfy this additional constraint, and thus do not depend on the past. We call
strategies that utilize the same mixed action at each time step “static strategies”. Although
the problem of finding an optimal static strategy2 is NP-hard, there exist algorithms that
efficiently find an approximate solution [Liuzzi et al., 2020]. In this paper, we compare the
optimal payoff in static strategies to the value of the game (achievable through stationary
strategies) in different scenarios and provide bounds on the loss incurred from applying this
2Typically the game has no value in static strategies. Hence, hereafter, when discussing the value in




Our contribution. The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we study the problems
arising from zero-sum games with switching costs and provide a complete characterization
of the payoff function and the optimal stationary strategies. We show that these strategies
belong to a particular finite set that depends only on the underlying one-shot game, not the
switching costs. This can be used as a basis for an algorithm to compute them. Second, we
study the value that can be obtained by using simpler static strategies and provide bounds
on the loss incurred by using them instead of stationary ones. We show that in some cases,
the value is obtained by static strategies, so there is no loss at all. In special cases (such
as switching costs that are independent of the actions, as in Lipman and Wang [2000, 2009],
Schoenmakers et al. [2008]), we can also provide a complete characterization of the payoff
function in static strategies and show that in this case too, the optimal strategies belong to
a particular finite set which depends solely on the one-shot game.
In particular, we find that the value function in stationary strategies is piece-wise linear
in the weight of the switching costs, c. This means that the optimal strategy depends only
on the segment in which c is situated, not on the exact value of c. Moreover, our finding has
two important implications. First, it means that the player can identify the optimal strategy
without knowing the exact weight of the switching costs relative to the game (which is true in
the setting of Rass and Rainer [2014]). Second, it allows the player to assess the improvement
in value that can be obtained if the switching costs are reduced, as the optimal strategy does
not change for small changes of c. For example, if the guard can switch suppliers and reduce
fuel costs by a small amount (say 1%), our result ensures him that he does not need to adapt
his strategy to the new cost (it is still optimal) and that the improvement in payoff is linear
in this 1%.
We show that the properties of the value function under stationary strategies also hold
for the value under static strategies, assuming that switching costs are independent of the
actions being switched. Typically this is not the case, and the optimal strategies might
strongly depend on c. We provide additional results on the optimal strategies in specific
games by adding stronger assumptions on the structure of the game or the switching costs.
For example, if in the game without switching costs the minimizing player has a unique
optimal strategy, this strategy remains optimal (both static and stationary) in the presence
of small switching costs, as suggested by Lipman and Wang [2009]. Similarly, we show that
when switching costs are symmetric (the amount paid when switching from pure action i to
j is the same as when switching from j to i), the bound on the difference between the value
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in stationary and static strategies is smaller than when switching costs are not symmetric.
We then generalize our work to wider classes of games and obtain general bounds on the
loss arising from using history-independent strategies relative to history-dependent ones. In
particular, we show that at least a quarter of the optimal payoff can be obtained using very
simple history-independent strategies.
Structure of the paper. This section is followed by a short review of the related literature.
In Section 2 we formally present the model. In Section 3 we provide our results. We start
with a general characterization of the value functions (Section 3.1), followed by a series of
theorems concerning the bound on the difference between the value in stationary and in static
strategies. Then, in Section 4, we consider static strategies for stochastic games and deduce
appropriate bounds. A short discussion follows in Section 5. In Appendix A we present the
average cost of optimality (ACOE) algorithm which is used to compute optimal stationary
strategies and the value of the game. The solved example in the Appendix also provides
some intuition regarding our results and in particular Proposition 1.
1.1 Related Literature
Switching costs have been studied in different economic settings, mainly in non-zero-sum
games, where the main questions concerned the existence of a Folk Theorem, players’ ability
to credibly punish each other, and the commitment that switching costs add. A common
simplifying assumption is that all switching costs are identical and independent of the actions
being switched [Lipman and Wang, 2000, 2009]. This requires only one additional parameter
to cover switching costs and allows concise analysis of the effect of the magnitude of switching
costs on different aspects of the game. We allow switching costs to depend on actions, but
take the same approach, adding one variable and studying its effect on the outcome of the
game. In our model, this variable is a multiplicative factor affecting all switching costs in the
same manner. This allows us to capture more real-life situations and consider wider-ranging
possibilities in different models.
In addition to this generalization, our paper fills two gaps in the switching costs literature.
First, except for Schoenmakers et al. [2008], zero-sum games are generally overlooked in
explorations of switching costs. Although they can be viewed as merely a sub-case of general
games, the considerations addressed for zero-sum games are substantially different from those
for non-zero-sum games and therefore require a specific focus. This paper, by considering
zero-sum games, both addresses zero-sum situations and provides a reference point for non-
zero-sum games. For example, when determining the worst-case payoff (the individually
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rational payoff), the auxiliary game to consider is a zero-sum game.
It should be noted that even Schoenmakers et al. [2008] did not consider games with
switching costs, but rather games with bonuses, where one player receives a bonus from
repeating the same action, due to a “learning by doing” effect. They argued that if the op-
ponent is a computer, then it does not “learn” and should not receive a bonus for playing the
same action. However, using equivalent transformations, the model of Schoenmakers et al.
[2008] can be rewritten to fit our model, with the additional restriction that switching costs
are independent of actions. Thus, our paper generalizes their work in terms of optimal value
in stationary and static strategies (which they call “simple strategies”) and their dependence
on switching costs relative to the payoffs of the game. Since their model is more specific than
ours, they are able to provide additional results. For example, by assuming that the one-shot
payoff matrix is regular, they provide a formula for the value of the game.
Second, although static strategies are considered by many (Schoenmakers et al. [2008]
and Bomze et al. [2020] are two prominent examples), the main focus is on the computa-
tional aspects of the optimal static strategies or approximations of them [Liuzzi et al., 2020].
We provide theoretical background for the use of static strategies and can explain several
phenomena reported by these empirical works, such as the fact that optimal strategies only
change slightly (if at all) in response to a small change in the ratio between switching costs
and stage payoffs. We believe that our work contributes both by examining the quality of
approximations of optimal strategies and by suggesting some ways to improve the computa-
tional aspects of the algorithms.
In particular, we provide a bound on the difference between the optimal stationary value
and the optimal static value. Using our theoretical bound, the “price of using static strate-
gies” can be calculated and compared to other factors, such as computational complexity.
Such a comparison has never been made before, since solving the game and finding the value
in stationary strategies is generally very challenging computationally.
2 The Switching Costs Model
A zero-sum game with switching costs is a tuple Γ “ pA,S, cq where A “ paijq is an m ˆ n
matrix, S “ psijq is an nˆn matrix and c ě 0. At each time step t, Player 1 (the row player,
the maximizer, she) chooses an integer3 iptq in the set t1, . . . ,mu and Player 2 (the column
player, the minimizer, he) chooses an integer jptq in the set t1, . . . , nu. The stage payoff that
3We assume action sets are finite. Without loss of generality, we identify them as integers representing the
corresponding row or column in the payoff matrix.
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Player 2 pays Player 1 is aiptqjptq ` csjpt´1qjptq, so Player 2 is penalized for switching from
previous action jpt ´ 1q to action jptq by csjpt´1qjptq . We assume that skj ě 0 and sjj “ 0,
for all k, j. Moreover, we normalize S by assuming min
skj‰0
skj “ 1. Due to the multiplicative
factor c, this normalization is without loss of generality. In some of the examples below we
avoid it for ease of exposition.
At each time period, the players are also allowed to play mixed actions. A mixed action is
a probability distribution over the player’s action set. Note that at time t, jpt´ 1q is already
known, even if Player 2 played a mixed action at time t´1. The process repeats indefinitely,
and the payoff is the undiscounted average (lim inf)4. More precisely, let pσ, τq be a pair of
strategies in the repeated game and pσptq, τptqq the mixed actions played at stage t (given
the history). We define











where upiptq, jptqq “ aiptqjptq ` csjpt´1qjptq is the stage payoff defined above (no switching cost
is paid at t “ 1).
When c “ 0, this simply involves indefinitely repeating the one-shot matrix game A.
Without loss of generality, we assume in the theorems that the minimal and the maximal
entries in A are 0 and 1 (but not in the examples, for clarity). We define A as the set of
optimal strategies for Player 2 in the one-shot game A, v the value of the game and v̄ the
minmax value in pure strategies. In the rest of the paper, we will assume that A and S are
fixed and examine how the optimal strategies of the players and their payoffs change with c,
the relative weight of the switching costs compared to the stage payoff of game A.
This repeated game is equivalent to a stochastic game [Shapley, 1953] where each state
represents the previous action of Player 2. The set of actions in all states is the same as
in A and the payoff in state k when Player 1 plays i and Player 2 plays j is aij ` cskj. In
this stochastic game, only Player 2 controls the state transitions.5 This class of games was
studied by Filar [1980], who showed that the value exists and obtained in strategies that
depend solely on the current state, not on the entire history of the game, namely stationary
strategies. It follows that the value of the repeated game exists as well, and it is obtained in
strategies that depend solely on the previous action of Player 2. We name these strategies
4Other methods of defining the undiscounted payoff can be considered, all of which coincide in this model
according to Filar [1980].
5The initial state is irrelevant, as in each time step all states are reachable and the payoff from any single
stage is negligible compared to the long-term average. For every state s, Player 2 can ensure that the game
starting at t “ 2 will have initial state s.
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too stationary strategies and denote the value for each c by vpcq.
Definition 1. A stationary strategy is a strategy that depends in each t on the previous
action of Player 2, jpt ´ 1q, but not on the rest of the history or t itself. Hence, a stationary
strategy is a vector of n mixed actions, one to follow each possible pure action of Player 2.













. Without switching costs (c “ 0), the optimal
strategy for Player 2 is 1
11
p6, 3, 2q and the value is v “ 6
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. For clarity, we denote the actions
of Player 2 as L (left), M (middle) and R (right).
In the equivalent stochastic game, there are three states representing the situation after
each of the actions is played. We denote by si the state where Player 2 played action







0 2 ` c c







1 ` c 0 c
c 2 c







1 ` c c 0





In stationary strategies, each player chooses three mixed strategies, one for each state. ♦
We also consider a simpler class of strategies, which are history-independent.
Definition 2. A static strategy is a strategy that plays the same mixed action in each stage,
regardless of the history. Hence, a static strategy is one mixed action played repeatedly.
Typically, when we limit the players to static strategies, the value may not exist. This
can be understood if we compare the maximin and the minimax of the repeated game in
static strategies. In terms of the maximin, the best response of Player 2 can be pure and
no switching is needed. On the other hand, the minimizing strategy of Player 2 is typically
mixed and the payoff depends on c. Therefore, when considering static strategies, the figure
of merit we study is the minimax – the maximal cost that Player 2 can guarantee to pay.
If Player 1 uses static strategy x and Player 2 plays static strategy y, the payoff can be
written in matrix notation as
gpcqpx, yq “ xTAy ` cyTSy. (2)
If Player 2 is limited to static strategies, Player 1 can best respond with a static strategy







For simplicity, we sometimes refer to this as the value in static strategies, but it should be
understood as only the minimax value.
Our results are presented in two parts. First, we characterize both value functions. Next,
we bound the difference between them, which represents Player 2’s possible loss from playing
a static strategy instead of a stationary strategy (clearly, ṽpcq ě vpcq).
The weighted average model. Another natural way to include switching costs in the
payoff is by considering some weighted average between the stage payoff and the switching
costs. This was done by Rass and Rainer [2014] and others [Rass et al., 2017, Wachter et al.,
2018, Liuzzi et al., 2020], who studied a model where players use static strategies and the
payoff is a weighted average of the switching costs and the costs of the game itself: αxTAy `
p1 ´ αqyTSy, with α P r0, 1s. Their model is slightly different from our model. For example,
in our work, it is straightforward that as c increases, the situation worsens for Player 2.
However, in their case, when the weight on the switching costs tends to 1, the value of the
game (with switching costs) tends to 0 and the situation “improves” if the value without
switching costs was positive.
Nevertheless, the models are equivalent. Setting c “ 1´α
α
, we get the same ratio between
the two payoffs and, as a result, the games are strategically equivalent. Hence, our work sheds
some theoretical light on their results as well as on general economic situations in which the
switching costs are added to the real costs and not averaged with them.
3 Results
In Subsection 3.1, we characterize the value function vpcq and the minimax value function
in static strategies ṽpcq. We benefit from these characterizations in Subsection 3.2, where
we bound the difference between the two for any game with switching costs. In Subsections
3.3 and 3.4, we find tighter bounds by considering a more restrictive model. With the
appropriate restrictions on c, the bound can even reduce to zero, which implies that in some
cases there is a static strategy that is optimal. We also make restrictions on the structure of
the switching-cost matrix S by making the off-diagonal elements equal.
Clearly, if Player 2 has an optimal pure action in A without switching costs, then this
action is also optimal with switching costs and vpcq “ ṽpcq “ vp0q for all c ě 0. In the rest of
the paper, we therefore assume that the value of the game A without switching costs cannot
be obtained in pure actions.
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3.1 The Properties of the Value Functions
In this subsection we characterize vpcq where c ě 0, namely the value function in stationary
strategies (Proposition 1). We show that there are finitely many segments of the nonnegative
real line such that for each segment there exists an optimal stationary strategy of Player 2 that
is independent of the exact c (Corollary 1). We also characterize ṽpcq where c ě 0, namely
the minimax value function in static strategies (Proposition 2). We continue Example 1 to
demonstrate these value functions and the corresponding optimal strategies. We then provide
two counterexamples to two natural conjectures. In Example 2, we show that Corollary 1
does not hold for ṽpcq in general. In Example 3, we show that it is possible for stationary
strategies to strictly outperform static strategies for all c ą 0.
Proposition 1. For every c ě 0, the game has a value in stationary strategies denoted by
vpcq. This function is continuous, increasing, concave, and piece-wise linear.
Proof This game is equivalent to a stochastic game where the states correspond to the
previous pure actions chosen by Player 2. In this stochastic game, only one player controls
the transitions, so existence follows from Filar [1980] and Filar and Raghavan [1984].
Moreover, according to Filar and Raghavan [1984], the value of the game is the same as
the value of a one-shot matrix game, whose pure actions are the pure stationary actions in
the stochastic game (essentially, each pure strategy in the one-shot game is a vector of size n
dictating which pure actions to choose at each state). The payoffs include the corresponding
payoffs from matrix A as well as c-dependent payoffs from the transitions. Since only Player 2
controls the states, the c-dependent part is the same for all entries in the same column and
is linear in c. For example, if the pure action of Player 2 is to alternate between actions 2
and 1, the c-dependent part of the column is s12`s21
2
c. We denote the entry in the i, j place
of this one-shot game by bij ` βjc.
In order to characterize vpcq, we look at the value function of this one-shot matrix game.
The value of this game is determined by the optimal strategy profiles, which are the same
as the Nash-equilibrium strategy profiles. We show that given the support of the Nash-
equilibrium strategy profiles, the expected payoff from Player 1’s best response is linear in
c. We also show that the value function is pieced together from these finitely many linear
functions, so it is piece-wise linear in c.
Fix c1 ě 0 and let I1 (I2) be some subset of the rows (columns) of the one-shot game.
We check whether Player 2 can make Player 1 indifferent among all the actions in I1, using
a completely mixed action over I2, and can make Player 1 prefer them over actions not in
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I1. Let k be a pure action in I1. Player 1 is indifferent among the actions in I1 if









and prefers them over other actions if









The c1-dependent part cancels out. If we add
ř
jPI2
yj “ 1 and @j P I2 : yj ą 0, we get a
system of linear equations and inequalities in |I2| variables which is independent of c
1. If this
system has a solution, then there exists at least one solution that is independent of c1. Let
us denote it by ypI1, I2q.
When Player 2 plays according to ypI1, I2q, the expected payoff of each row is a linear
function of c with the same slope (as shown above), and a higher constant for the I1 rows
relative to the others. Hence, when Player 1 best responds, he chooses an action in ∆pI1q
and the payoff will be a linear function of c, denoted by lpI1, I2qpcq. Note that we did not
establish that ypI1, I2q is optimal for Player 2. It is optimal only if it is a best response to
Player 1’s best response to ypI1, I2q, or, equivalently, if Player 1 can make Player 2 indifferent
among all actions in I2 by mixing the actions in I1 (which typically depends on c).
For a given c˚, take an optimal strategy profile. This profile has a corresponding support
pair pI˚1 , I
˚




2 q is an optimal strategy for Player 2 and vpc




There are finitely many support pairs pI1, I2q, and at every c the value function equals
one of their corresponding lines lpI1, I2q. Since the value function vp¨q is continuous in c (this
is a polynomial game, see Shapley and Snow [1950]), it is also piece-wise linear in c.
In addition, since all the entries in S are non-negative, all the coefficients of c (the slopes
of the lines) are non-negative, so vpcq is an increasing function of c.
Finally, the function vpcq is concave. Let rck, ck`1s and rck`1, ck`2s be two segments
where vpcq is linear. For c˚ P pck, ck`1q, let ypc
˚q be the optimal action of Player 2 chosen
using the above method. If Player 2 plays ypc˚q regardless of c, the payoff is a linear function
of c that coincides with the value on rck, ck`1s. In the region rck`1, ck`2s, the value function
must be below this line, so the slope of c must decrease. Hence, vpcq is a piece-wise linear
function with decreasing slope and thus it is concave.
If on an interval the value function vpcq is linear, then there is a Player 2 strategy that
is optimal for this entire interval, irrespective of the precise value of c. A direct result of
the piece-wise linearity of vpcq is that the exact value of c does not need to be known to
11
find an optimal strategy, only the segment that contains it matters. This means that the
optimal strategies are robust to small changes of c: knowing the exact c is not necessary
to play optimally, and it is almost universally unnecessary to adjust the optimal strategy
as c changes. Moreover, this shows that when the model arises from a weighted average of
different goal functions [Rass and Rainer, 2014], the exact weight given to the switching costs
compared to the stage payoff is of smaller significance, if any (as the authors indeed report
for static strategies).
Even if there is no information on c, an optimal strategy for Player 2 can still be found
in a finite set that depends only on A. This observation can serve as a basis for an algorithm
to compute an optimal stationary strategy in the game with switching costs. Interestingly,
this is not true for Player 1. In general, the optimal strategy for Player 1 depends on the
exact c and changes continuously with c.
Corollary 1. There exists K P N and 0 “ c0 ă c1 ă . . . ă cK ă cK`1 “ 8 such that for each
segment rci, ci`1s there exists an optimal stationary strategy of Player 2 that is independent
of the exact c.
Proof Since the function vpcq is piece-wise linear, the segments are chosen such that in
each one, vpcq is linear. Fix c˚ P pci, ci`1q and fix σc˚ an optimal strategy for Player 2 in the
stochastic game. Suppose Player 2 plays σc˚ regardless of c and Player 1 best responds.
When Player 2 plays σc˚ , he fixes the transition probabilities between states, and these
are now independent of c. Hence, the percentage of time spent in each state is constant and
independent of c. In each state, all entries in a particular column have the same slope (in
state i, column j has slope sij), so their mix according to σc˚ results in parallel lines (parallel
in each state, not necessarily parallel between states). Player 1 best responds in each state,
but since the lines are parallel, his choice does not depend on c. Thus, the payoff in each state
is a linear function of c, and the total payoff, which is a weighted average of these functions
with the percentage of time spent in each state as weights, is a linear function of c. Denote
this function by fc˚pcq.
Since vpcq is the value, vpcq ď fc˚pcq for all c in the segment with equality at c
˚. Thus,
these two lines that intersect once must coincide and σc˚ obtains the value in the entire
segment.
The concavity of vpcq can be intuitively understood as follows. For a large c, it is more
costly to switch so Player 2 chooses strategies that incur smaller switching costs despite
some loss in the stage game A. Hence, as c increases, the coefficient of c decreases and the
rate at which the value increases with c is reduced. This observation can serve in practice
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to eliminate from the choice of strategies those with too-high expected per-stage switching
costs.
The minimax value in static strategies exhibits the same properties, except piece-wise
linearity. Here, it can only be established that the value function is semi-algebraic, so there
is no version of Corollary 1 for this case. It is quite possible that the optimal strategy depends
on c, as shown in Example 2.
Proposition 2. The minimax value ṽpcq in static strategies is a continuous, increasing, and
concave semi-algebraic function.
Proof Let gpcqpx, yq “ xTAy`cyTSy be a function from R`ˆ∆pt1, . . . ,muqˆ∆pt1, . . . , nuq















gpcqpx, yq depends solely on y and not on c (and can always be one of
t1, . . . ,mu). Since gpcqpx, yq is continuous and since the maximum and the minimum of
a continuous function is also continuous, so is ṽpcq. Moreover, ṽpcq is semi-algebraic since
gpcqpx, yq is a polynomial in each variable.
The function ṽpcq is increasing: Let 0 ď c1 ă c2. We show that ṽpc1q ď ṽpc2q. Let yc2 be
the argmin of the minimization in Eq. (6).
ṽpc2q “ max
xP∆pt1,...,muq
tgpc2qpx, yc2qu ě max
x1P∆pt1,...,muq
tgpc1qpx
1, yc2qu ě ṽpc1q.
The equality follows from the definition of ṽpc2q. The first inequality follows from c1 ă c2
and S ě 0 (the maximizing x is the same as it depends solely on yc2). The last inequality
follows from the definition of ṽpc1q.
The function ṽpcq is concave: Let 0 ď c1 ă c2 and let β P p0, 1q. Then































“ βṽpc1q ` p1 ´ βqṽpc2q.
The first and last equalities are the definition of ṽ. The second equality is based on the fact
that argmax
x
gpcqpx, yq does not depend on c. The inequality is obtained since minimizing
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each term individually and then summing results yields a smaller result than first summing
and then minimizing the entire expression.
In the following example, we demonstrate how the two values behave as a function of c.
Only the results are presented here; the calculations are in Appendix A.
Example 1 (Continued). A variation of matching pennies with uniform switching
costs.
The Value of the Game – vpcq
Case 1: c ă 22
31
: The optimal strategy for Player 2 in game A is still optimal for this case,







ď c ď 121
156
: The switch from L to R is too costly, so action R is removed from





pMq. The optimal strategies in the other
states are the same as in the game without switching costs. The value is vpcq “ 156c`198
319
.
Case 3: c ě 121
156
: The switch from L to M is too costly, so sL becomes an absorbing state
with payoff 1.
The Minimax Value in Static Strategies – ṽpcq
In this simple case there is no intermediate strategy for Player 2. He either plays the
optimal strategy of game A when switching costs are low enough or he plays the pure minimax
strategy of A and never switches when they are high enough. A direct computation reveals
that the cut-off c is 55
72
.
Comparison: Figure 1 shows the static solution ṽpcq (dashed) and the stochastic game
solution vpcq (solid) in the region where they differ. The maximal difference is found at
c “ 55
71
and is equal to 37
2088
. ♦
With additional assumptions, the result of Proposition 2 can be strengthened. In par-
ticular, in the common case where all switches are equally costly (uniform switching costs),
the result can be strengthened to piece-wise linearity (Proposition 7). In the latter case, the
set of optimal static strategies can be fully characterized and it is finite. This is not true in
the general case, where the only conclusion that can be made (see the remarks after Propo-
sition 7) is that when playing an optimal static strategy, Player 2 keeps Player 1 indifferent
in game A between at least two of his pure actions.












. It is easy to verify that for c ď 1
98
the











Figure 1: The value in optimal (stationary) strategies vpcq (solid) and the minimax value in
static strategies ṽpcq (dashed) of the game from Example 1.
and third columns with equal probability) that leads to a payoff of ṽpcq “ 50c, and that
for c ě 1
2
the optimal strategy (static and stationary) is the pure minimax with a payoff of







, the optimal static strategy of Player 2 is rppLq, 1 ´ 2ppMq, ppRqs
where p “ 1´2c
192c




, which is not linear in c. ♦
Corollary 1 suggests that the optimal stationary strategy in the first segment (which
includes c “ 0) is optimal even without switching costs, so it must be comprised of optimal
strategies in game A. If there is only one optimal strategy in the game (as in Example 1), then
the optimal stationary strategy is actually static and in that segment, vpcq “ ṽpcq. However,
in general, this may not be the case. The following example shows that it is possible that
stationary strategies will always outperform static strategies (except, of course, at c “ 0).
Example 3. A game with ṽpcq ą vpcq for all c ą 0.
Suppose A “ p 1 0 1 0
0 1 0 1
q and S “
ˆ
0 0 1 1
1 0 0 1
1 1 0 0
0 1 1 0
˙
. The value of A is 0.5 and is achieved by any
mixed action of Player 2 choosing the set of even columns w.p. 0.5. Switching-cost matrix
S is such that, based on the action of Player 2 in the previous time period, the only costless
actions are the same action and the action to the right of the previous action. Due to this
cyclical nature of S, Player 2 can achieve the value of game A with a stationary strategy,
by playing the previous action w.p. 0.5 and the action to the right w.p. 0.5. Clearly, any
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static non-pure strategy will contain a c component, and any pure static strategy will result
in ṽpcq “ 1. To conclude, ṽpcq ą vpcq “ 0.5 for all c ą 0. ♦
3.2 A Uniform Bound on the Value Differences in Static and Stationary
Strategies
Our goal is to compare vpcq and ṽpcq and evaluate any loss ṽpcq ´ vpcq due to using a static
strategy instead of a stationary strategy. Our first bound is very general and does not rely
heavily on game-specific assumptions (Proposition 4). Then we improve the bound by taking
into account additional properties of the game, such as the multiplicity of equilibria in A and
the structure of S (Theorem 1). We start by showing that in the simplest set of games, 2ˆ 2
games, the optimal stationary strategy is always a static strategy (Proposition 3). This is a
generalization of Theorems 4.1, 4.2 and Corollary 4.1 in Schoenmakers et al. [2008].
Proposition 3. Let A be a 2 ˆ 2 zero-sum game. For every S and every c, there exists an
optimal stationary strategy in switching-costs game pA,S, cq that is a static strategy. Thus,
ṽpcq “ vpcq.











matrix for Player 2. We assume that the value in A without switching costs cannot be
obtained using pure strategies (otherwise the discussion is trivial), so w.l.o.g., α ą β, α ą γ,
δ ą β, and δ ą γ. Let p P p0, 1q be the probability of playing the left column (action L) in A
that achieves the value (a direct computation shows that only one such p exists). As in the
examples, we denote by si the new state when the previous action of Player 2 was i P tL,Ru.
Based on Proposition 1 and the ACOE method (Appendix A), the optimal stationary
strategy for Player 2 is such that in each state Player 1 is either indifferent between his
two actions or plays purely one of them. Since the same switching costs and continuation
payoffs are added to all entries of the same column of each si (see Eq. (7)), they do not affect
Player 1’s choice of rows. Thus, in each state either Player 2 plays purely too or he plays the
mixed action p. All the possible combinations of these actions are summarized in Table 1.
For example, in case I he plays p in both states, whereas in case IV he plays p only at state
sR, while after playing L (and reaching sL) he always plays purely action R. In cases II and
III he is absorbed in states sL or sR (resp.), so the action in the other state is irrelevant.
Note that cases I, II, and III represent a static strategy, so to show that vpcq “ ṽpcq
we must show that the strategies presented in cases IV and V cannot be optimal. Assume








Table 1: All the possible optimal stationary strategies.
continuation payoff after playing R (the continuation payoff after playing L is normalized to












Let us consider state sL. By assumption on the coefficients, α ą γ and δ ` κ ` cs ą
β ` κ ` cs. Since it is optimal to play purely R, we necessarily have
α ě β ` κ ` cs12 or γ ě δ ` κ ` cs12.
If only the first equation is true, the equilibrium is mixed and R is not optimal. If only the
second equation is true, then there is a contradiction:
α ą γ ě δ ` κ ` cs ą β ` κ ` cs ą α.
It follows that both equations are true, i.e. the right column dominates the left including the
continuation payoffs (this is only true in 2 ˆ 2 games) and in particular γ ě δ ` cs12 ` κ.
In state sR, however, the optimal strategy is mixed and therefore such dominance is not
possible. If the direction of the original inequalities remains correct, then δ ` κ ě γ ` cs21.
It follows that s12 ` s21 ď 0, which is a contradiction. The other option is that, since in sR
both inequalities changed direction, a contradiction can be constructed using the first row.
A similar approach can be used for case V and the proof is complete.
Thus, in the 2 ˆ 2 case, there are two candidates for optimal stationary strategy: either
playing the optimal strategy of A regardless of the previous action, or playing the pure
minimax action of A. Both are also static strategies. It is straightforward to calculate the
value in both cases and to determine the cut-off value of c above which playing the pure
minimax becomes profitable.
When either of the players has more than 2 actions in A, the value may differ under
static and stationary strategies. The following Proposition bounds this difference. Naturally,
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since this Proposition is general, the resulting bound is not easy to calculate or interpret.
However, in the Theorems that follow, we add more assumptions to obtain a bound in a
simple analytic manner.










• M “ max
yP∆pt1,...,nuq
yTSy is the maximal switching cost that Player 2 can pay,
• Ξ “ max
j,k
|Sjk ´ Skj| is a measure of the asymmetry of the switching-cost matrix.
Proof By definition of value vpcq, there exists a state j P S and a mixed action y P ∆pJq
such that for all i P I we have that the cost at j by playing y is less than vpcq (otherwise,
the payoff of Player 1 in each state can exceed vpcq and thus can be the total value).
Consider the static strategy ry of Player 2, that with probability 0.5 chooses action j and
otherwise chooses an action according to mixed action y. We know that if Player 2 plays a
static strategy then Player 1 has a static strategy best response. Let x be this best response.
Then, replacing ỹ by its definition, we have














Bounding yTSj from above with jSy ` Ξ and reorganizing leads to














We can now replace the first part of the bound by vpcq. Recall that A is normalized so that
max
i,j
aij “ 1 and S defined such that sii “ 0 for every i P t1, . . . , nu so:



















The bound is obtained by subtracting vpcq from both sides:
ṽpcq ´ vpcq ď 1
2






In Proposition 4, the bound depends on Ξ, which measures the symmetry of the switching-
cost matrix. Naturally, the symmetry of S has no effect on the minimax value in static
strategies. Recall that gpcqpx, yq from Eq. (2) expressed the expected payoff of Player 2 when
the players play a static strategy pair px, yq. When the expression for gpcqpx, yq is expanded,
each product yiyj is multiplied by psij ` sjiq. Hence, when solving for ṽpcq, only the sum of
symmetric off-diagonal elements of S matters, not their exact values. This, for example, is
the reason why Liuzzi et al. [2020] assumed that S is a symmetric matrix.
A stationary strategy, on the other hand, can take any asymmetry into account, yielding
different results. This can easily be seen in Example 3. If we change S into a symmetric
matrix while keeping the sums sij ` sji at their current values, the result will be a matrix
where every mixed stationary strategy has a c-component, whereas in the non-symmetric
case, the optimal stationary strategy kept vpcq “ 0.5 regardless of c.
Theorem 1. If matrix S is symmetric, Player 2’s loss from limiting himself to static strate-




M (where M is defined in Proposition 4).






Proof The first bound is a direct corollary from Proposition 4, setting Ξ “ 0. The second
part is obtained by relaxing the bound and reorganizing. By Proposition 4, we obtain
ṽpcq ´ vpcq ď 1
2




p1 ` cM ´ vpcqq.
We can deduce that
1 ` cM ´ ṽpcq “ 1 ` cM ´ vpcq ` pvpcq ´ ṽpcqq,
ě p1 ` cM ´ vpcqq ´ 1
2
p1 ` cM ´ vpcqq,
“ 1
2
p1 ` cM ´ vpcqq.
The reorganization of the bound to the fraction form presented in Eq. (8) has an intuitive
interpretation: by using static strategies, Player 2 loses at most half of what he could have
obtained with a stationary strategy. Had we done the analysis from the point of view of the
maximizing player, this Equation and the intuition would be further simplified into: “with






Figure 2: Different value functions for non-symmetric RPS. Solid: ∆ “ 0. Dashed: ∆ “ 1,
static strategy. Dotted: ∆ “ 1
3
.
sets the “price of being static ” at 1
2
when S is symmetric. Such a calculation is possible in
other settings too, such as the ones from Theorem 5, where the “price of being static ” is 1
4
.
It is important to note, however, that this approach is not always possible. In the following
example, when S is asymmetric the stationary strategy yields a worse result than when S is
symmetric, and in an extreme case – the optimal stationary strategy is actually static.
Example 4. Rock-Paper-Scissors (RPS) with non-symmetric S.












, where ´1 ď
∆ ď 1. The static solution remains the same regardless of ∆, and dictates choosing all
actions with equal probability if c ď 1.5 and purely playing one of the actions for larger cs.
The stationary strategy for ∆ “ 0 is to choose all actions with equal probability for c ď 1
and to play purely for c ě 2. For c P r1, 2s, the strategy involves cyclic behavior: after L
never play R, after M never play L, and after R never play M . In all cases, the previous
action is replayed w.p. 2
3
.
For ∆ “ 1
3









for c ď 9
8
“ 1.125. For a larger c, one action
is never played in each state, as discussed in the ∆ “ 0 case. This is true until c “ 9
5
. From
then on, the optimal strategy is to play purely.
For ∆ “ 1, the optimal stationary strategy is in fact the static one, and the two cases
coincide. All the cases are shown in Figure 2. ♦
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The bound from Proposition 4 is a general bound without making any assumptions on
game A or matrix S. As shown in Theorem 1, tighter bounds can be tailored to special cases.
In Subsection 3.3 we show that in certain cases, when c is either small or large, the optimal
strategies are static. This implies that the two value functions coincide on these segments
and the bound is 0.
In Subsection 3.4, we make further assumptions on the matrix S. While the diagonal
elements in S are all zeros, the off-diagonal elements are ones. This means that all switches
are equally costly, as suggested by Lipman and Wang [2000, 2009]. In this case, not only vpcq
but also ṽpcq is piece-wise linear, which strengthens the robustness result and simplifies the
process of finding the optimal static strategy. The search domain narrows down to a finite
(although large) predetermined set of mixed actions.
3.3 Optimality of a static strategy for Small and Large Values of c
In this section we tackle two possible assumptions affecting the two extremes of c. We first
show how to identify the case where, for small values of c, switching costs do not play a role
and the optimal stationary strategy is a static one. We next assume that there are no free
switches, i.e., that all non-diagonal elements of S are non-zero. In this case, again for large
enough c, the optimal stationary strategy is a static one, and moreover, pure.
We start with the small c case. In most models, switching costs are either ignored or
considered irrelevant, so comparing a case with no switching costs (c “ 0) to one with
small switching costs is important as a robustness check on this claim. Lipman and Wang
[2009] provide one such comparison in discussing the continuity of equilibrium payoffs and
equilibrium strategies when switching costs converge to zero. Here, we provide another
comparison: between the optimal stationary and static strategies when c is very small. We
have already established that in some cases (Example 1) small switching costs do not matter
and the optimal stationary strategy is also a static one, while in other cases (Example 3)
there is a difference between the two for every c ą 0. Hence, we are interested in finding
conditions enabling us to distinguish between the two types of cases.
Clearly, for c “ 0, value vp0q and the minimax value in static strategies ṽp0q coincide.
Let c be the maximal c such that for every c P r0, cs the value is attained by a static strategy,
so v and ṽ still coincide. As Proposition 5 shows, the exact value of c can be found in
polynomial time Opn4q.6 If c ą 0, it immediately reveals the optimal strategy in the entire
6With additional assumptions, this can be theoretically studied for particular classes of games. For example,
Schoenmakers et al. [2008] showed in their Corollary 6.1 that if A is a square matrix, the unique optimal
strategy for both players without switching costs is completely mixed and all off-diagonal entries in S are
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r0, cs region, both static and stationary. This optimal strategy in the game with switching
costs is repeatedly playing an optimal mixed action in game A that incurs the lowest switching
costs according to S.
Proposition 5. Let c be the maximal c such that vpcq “ ṽpcq for every c P r0, cs. If c ą 0,
then for every c P r0, cs the value is attained by the static strategy y˚ “ argmin
yPA
yTSy. This
c can be found in polynomial time Opn4q.
Proof First, note that y˚ “ argmin
yPA
yTSy, the optimal strategy for Player 2 in game
A with the lowest average switching costs is well defined: A is a compact set, yTSy is
continuous, so it has a minimum and y˚ can be taken as any of them. We assume that y˚ is
not pure, otherwise the entire discussion is trivial.
We still need to find c. Let I1 be the largest support of optimal actions of Player 1 in
A and x0 P I1 (arbitrarily chosen). Use ACOE (see Appendix A) with undiscounted payoff
γpcq “ v` cy˚TSy˚ and actions x0, y
˚ in each state. This results in an nˆn linear equation,
where the unknowns are the continuation payoffs, their coefficients are the elements of y˚,
and the free elements are linear functions of c. Solve it to find the continuations payoffs (they
are linear functions of c).
Then, plug in the continuation payoffs to each state and consider each state as a one-shot
game. Since both the switching costs and the continuation payoffs are the same in each
column, as in the proof of Proposition 1, they cancel out. Thus when Player 2 plays y˚, he
makes Player 1 indifferent among all the actions in I1 and prefer them over all the other
actions.
Next, check whether in each such game, y˚ can actually be played by Player 2 in equilib-
rium, i.e. check whether Player 1 has a mixed action over I1 that keeps Player 2 indifferent
among all the columns for which y˚i ą 0 and still preferring them over the ones where y
˚
i “ 0
(this time, including the switching costs and the continuation payoffs!). Each such test con-
sists of solving another (order of) nˆn linear equation (and verifying some inequalities) and
results in an upper bound on c for which the solution is indeed a distribution over the rows.
The minimum of all these n upper bounds is the required c.
Recall that we assume that the diagonal of S is zero, while the off-diagonal elements are
non-negative and for normalization, the minimal non-zero element is 1. Now we also assume
that there are no free switches, i.e., all off-diagonal elements of S are strictly positive. In this
case, increasing c increases the cost of playing mixed strategies and, at some point, it will
equal (as in our §3.4), then c ą 0.
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be optimal to play purely. The cutoff after which the optimal stationary strategy is pure is
denoted by c̄. The following proposition proves its existence and generalizes Theorem 6.3 in
Schoenmakers et al. [2008].
Proposition 6. Let S be a matrix where all off-diagonal elements are strictly positive. Then
there exists c̄ s.t. Player 2’s optimal strategy for every c ě c̄ is the pure minimax strategy
in the matrix game A, but not for c ă c̄. Hence, vpcq “ ṽpcq “ v̄ for c ě c̄, where v̄ is the
minimax of game A in pure actions.
Proof In each state, when c Ñ 8, switching a pure action is strictly dominated by
replaying it (alternatively, when c Ñ 8, in the matrix from Filar and Raghavan [1984],
all pure actions that represent switches become dominated since c is multiplied by positive
constants). Hence, for c large enough, Player 2 never changes his action and plays the same
pure action for all t. Under this restriction, the optimal strategy is to play the pure minimax
action of matrix game A. Clearly, this is also a static strategy.
The case of large c is interesting, as it represents a situation where the switching cost is
higher than the possible one-stage gain. For example, the profit of a firm that adjusts its
price to dominate a market can be much smaller than the adjustment cost, provided that the
other firms in the market respond quickly enough. Chakrabarti [1990] studied this scenario
for supergames and showed how such high switching costs affect the set of possible equilibria
and the optimal strategies, which must include only finitely many action switches.
Although we have no efficient algorithm to calculate c̄, an upper bound for it can be
found in the following manner. A sufficient condition for the optimal stationary strategy to
be pure is that one pure action of the one-shot game presented in Filar and Raghavan [1984]
strictly dominates all others (see the proof of Proposition 1). Hence, every mixed entry in











Ideally, we would like to have the exact value of c̄ or the smallest possible upper bound
(this will more accurately provide the difference between vpcq and ṽpcq). For example, check-
ing all the values in the matrix and finding the maximal for the above expression would be
a better algorithm than what follows. However, given the large matrix (order of nm ˆ nn),
computation would be hard and time-consuming. Instead, we can maximize the expression
element-by-element – requiring that βj and bij be minimal but not necessarily for the same
i, j.
By normalization, the lowest off-diagonal switching cost is 1. Since βj is the average
switching cost per stage, we take it to be the minimum, which is 1. Similarly, for bij we can
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choose the lowest entry in A. An upper bound on c̄ can be written as
ˆ̄c “ v̄ ´ min
i,j
aij “ v̄, (9)
since A was normalized s.t. min
i,j
aij “ 0. In all the following calculations and formulas, if the
exact value of c̄ is unknown, it is possible to use ˆ̄c remembering that ˆ̄c ě c̄ and hence the
bound will be less precise (larger).
Subsequently, the only region where stationary strategies might out-perform static ones
is pc, c̄q. As the following example shows, however, a static strategy could be optimal for
some cs in this region.













. For c ă 1
6
, the optimal stationary strategy
is the static strategy that chooses each action w.p. 1
3
, regardless of the history. Starting
from c “ 1
6
, it is too costly to play R after M , so the optimal stationary strategy is to play
r0.5pLq, 0.5pMqs in sM (and each action w.p.
1
3
in the two other states). In this region, the
stationary strategy outperforms static strategies.
Next, at c “ 3
13
, it is also too costly to play R in sL and this action is never played.
The optimal stationary strategy is the static strategy that plays r0.5pLq, 0.5pMqs at every
stage. This remains true until c is high enough to make switching too costly and the optimal
strategy is playing a pure action which leads to vpcq “ ṽpcq “ 1. ♦
In the above example, vpcq “ ṽpcq before c̄, where the value functions flatten. As outside
pc, c̄q the value functions are equal, the only region of interest is pc, c̄q, and the following
theorem bounds the difference in payoff functions there.






pc ´ cq c̄´c0
c̄´c s if c P pc, c0q,
pc̄ ´ cq c0´c
c̄´c s if c P pc0, c̄q,
0 otherwise,
(10)
where s “ y˚TSy˚, c0 “
v̄´v
s
and c and y˚ are defined in Proposition 5, and c̄ in Proposition 6.
Proof Define s “ y˚TSy˚ (y˚ is defined in Proposition 5). From concavity, vpcq lies
above the line that connects pc, v ` csq and pc̄, v̄q (denoted by l). Function ṽpcq must be
below lines v̄ (corresponding to a pure static strategy) and v ` cs (corresponding to static
strategy y˚). These lines meet at c0 “
v̄´v
s








Figure 3: The intuition for the bound in Eq. (10). The maximal difference between vpcq and
ṽpcq is smaller than the maximal difference between the dashed and the solid lines, which is
attained at c0.
value in static and in stationary strategies is at most the difference between line v` cs and l,
and for c ą c0 it is the difference between v and l (see Fig. 3). A direct computation reveals
that these differences are as in Eq. (10).
In Theorem 2, we construct a bound by comparing a lower bound on vpcq with an upper
bound on ṽpcq. This upper bound is constructed by using two feasible and simple static
strategies: the minimax pure action of game A and an optimal mixed action of game A, the
one with the lowest switching cost. Any convex combination of these two static strategies is
also a static strategy and can also be considered to improve the bound.
In particular, assume y˚ is, for Player 2 in game A, the optimal mixed action with the
lowest switching costs (y˚ “ argmin
yPA
yTSy) and ȳ is the pure minimax action of Player 2 (so
ȳTSȳ “ 0). For every α P r0, 1s, yα “ αy
˚ ` p1 ´ αqȳ is also a feasible static strategy for
Player 2 and its payoff bounds ṽpcq from above.
Theorem 3. Let ȳ be a pure minimax action in game A, and denote by ŝ “ y˚TSȳ` ȳTSy˚.7
If s ą ŝ, then for every c P rc1, c2s X pc, c̄q, the bound from Theorem 2 can be improved by
using




7Different bounds can be attained by using different pure minimax actions (if there are several). In that








Proof For every x, the payoff of the strategy pair px, yαq is
gpcqpx, yαq “ xAyα ` cy
T
αSyα







Since y˚ is optimal in A, it guarantees the value and xAy˚ ď v. Similarly, ȳ guarantees the
minimax value so xAȳ ď v̄. As previously, we let s “ y˚TSy˚ and to simplify the expressions
also ŝ “ y˚TSȳ ` ȳTSy˚ (note that if S is symmetric, ŝ “ 2y˚TSȳ). Therefore gpcqpx, yαq
can be bounded by the following quadratic function of α:
gpcqpx, yαq ď αv ` p1 ´ αqv̄ ` α
2cs ` αp1 ´ αqcŝ “ α2cps ´ ŝq ` αpcŝ ` v ´ v̄q ` v̄ :“ fpαq.
Since ṽpcq ď gpcqpx, yαq, it follows that ṽpcq ď min
αPr0,1s
fpαq. Hence, by finding this minimum,
we can obtain a tighter bound on ṽpcq ´ vpcq relative to Theorem 2.
If f is concave, the minimum is obtained on one of the extreme points (depending on c),
which takes us back to the case of Theorem 2. In fact, we depart from the case presented
in Theorem 2 only if f is convex and the minimum is inside p0, 1q, i.e. only if s ą ŝ and
0 ď v̄´v´cŝ
2cps´ŝq ď 1.
For the rest of the proof we assume therefore that s ą ŝ. The condition 0 ď v̄´v´cŝ
2cps´ŝq ď 1
can be rearranged as a condition on c. The “0 ď” part becomes c ď c2 “
v̄´v
ŝ
and the “ď 1”
becomes c ě c1 “
v̄´v
2s´ŝ .






“ v̄ ´ pcŝ`v´v̄q
2
4cps´ŝq
instead of mintv̄, v ` csu. Thus, the bound for this domain is




An illustration of this bound can be found in Figure 4, applied to Example 2. Interestingly,
in this case the optimal static strategy is actually a mixture of y˚ and ȳ, so the bound is
tight and achieves the minimax value in static strategies. We demonstrate this bound through
Example 2 due to the strong variance in the switching-costs matrix. Without this variance,
this bound might not be applicable, as shown in Observation 1 for equal switching costs







Figure 4: The bound of Theorem 3, applied to Example 2. The solid line is vpcq, the dotted
line is the bound (in this example, it is also ṽpcq) and the dot-dashed line is the bound from
Theorem 2. For clarity, the graph was zoomed on the region near c0 where the difference is
the largest. All three meet at c̄.
3.4 Action-Independent Switching Costs
In this section, we consider the special case of switching costs which are independent of the
actions being switched (uniform switching costs), i.e. sij “ 1 for all i ‰ j. This case naturally
arises when the switching stem from the act of “switching” itself and do not depend on the
actions being switched to or from. For example, consider a person trying to multi-task.
Each time he switches from one task to another, it takes him a short time to regain focus
on the task he is about to perform. This time is generally fixed and does not depend on
the nature of the task (whereas the time spent actually performing different tasks can differ
significantly). This case was explored in previous papers, such as Lipman and Wang [2000,
2009] and Schoenmakers et al. [2008]. In fact, the model Schoenmakers et al. [2008] studied
is exactly the one presented here, up to an additive constant (as they pay a positive bonus
for not switching actions and nothing when actions are switched). We refer the interested
reader to Schoenmakers et al. [2008], who provide additional results using this model. For
example, they analyze in depth the case where A is an m ˆ 2 matrix and provide a formula
to compute the optimal strategy when A is a square matrix.
A significant benefit from the uniform switching-costs assumption is that finding the
optimal static strategy becomes simpler. Indeed, note first that under this assumption,
gpcqpx, yq can be significantly simplified. Let 1l be the ones matrix (for all i, j : p1lqij “ 1).
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Then S “ 1l ´ I and
ytSy “ ytp1l ´ Iqy “ yt1ly ´ ||y||2 “ 1 ´ ||y||2. (12)








Using this expression we can strengthen Proposition 2, as it turns out that now ṽpcq is piece-
wise linear. In a similar fashion to Corollary 1, this implies the existence of a finite set of
strategies to consider when looking for the optimal static strategy.
Proposition 7. Whenever switching costs are uniform (sij “ 1 for i ‰ j and 0 otherwise),
the minimax value ṽpcq in static strategies is a continuous, increasing, and concave piece-wise
linear function.
Proof It follows from Proposition 2 that ṽpcq is continuous, increasing, and concave.
Now we prove that it is also piece-wise linear. For each i P t1, . . . ,mu, let Ii be the subset of
∆pt1, . . . , nuq such that i is a best response for Player 1 in the one-shot game A to all y P Ii.
It is well known that Ii is a compact, convex polyhedron in R
n.
Now, suppose Player 2 is restricted to playing only in set Ii. The best response for







Ai is the ith row of A. The expression inside the minimization is a concave function in y and
the minimization domain is a polyhedron, so the minimum is attained at one of its vertices.
There are m polyhedrons and each one has finitely many vertices, so the set of candidate
optimal strategies is finite. Using a similar argument as in Proposition 1, it follows that ṽpcq
is piece-wise linear.
The reasoning behind this proof can be used to slightly strengthen Proposition 2 (even
without the additional assumption on S). If we restrict Player 2 to Ii and write gpcqpx, yq
in the general case explicitly (including the constraint
ř
yi “ 1), we obtain a function which
is concave in each of the variables yi. Thus, the argmin cannot be an interior point of Ii
and must lie on the boundary. However, since the function is not concave, the argmin is not
guaranteed to be on a vertex, and could be on the boundary, where it moves as c changes,
as in Example 2. Still, the fact that the argmin is on the boundary of one of the Iis means
that when playing an optimal static strategy, Player 2 keeps Player 1 indifferent between at
least two of her actions, and this can be used to reduce the dimension of the search.
As mentioned, a direct result of Proposition 7 is that the optimal strategy comes from a
finite set and is robust to the exact value of c. Unlike Corollary 1 however, this time it is
also true for the best responses of Player 1 (since she best-responds purely). This provides a
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theoretical explanation for the numerical results of Rass and Rainer [2014] and Liuzzi et al.
[2020], which indicate that slightly changing c (or α, in their model) has a small effect, if
any, on optimal strategies.
Corollary 2. When switching costs are uniform (sij “ 1 for i ‰ j and 0 otherwise), there
exists K P N and 0 “ c0 ă c1 ă c2 ă . . . ă cK ă cK`1 “ 8 such that for each segment
rci, ci`1s there exists a Player 2 strategy to achieve the minimax value ṽ in static strategies
that is suited to all cs in the segment.
The proof is identical to the proof of Corollary 1. Note that in general the number of segments
differs between vpcq and ṽpcq.
According to Proposition 7 and Corollary 2, there is a finite set of static strategies from
which an optimal static strategy can be selected for any c. This set can be large (exponential
in n), and the above results can be used to search more efficiently for the optimal strategy
within the set. For example, by calculating yTSy for each y in the set, the strategies in
the set can be ordered from largest to smallest. Since yTSy are the possible slopes of c
in ṽpcq and since ṽpcq is concave, if a particular y is found to be optimal for a specific c,
all ys with a higher slope can be excluded from the search domain for all larger cs. A
similar approach can be used to find the optimal stationary strategy as a consequence of
Proposition 1, keeping in mind that calculating the slope of c for a given stationary strategy
is slightly more complicated.
We can improve the bound from Proposition 4 by plugging in the explicit expression of
S.
Theorem 4. When switching costs are uniform (sij “ 1 for i ‰ j and 0 otherwise),









Proof The matrix S is symmetric, so Ξ “ 0. Moreover, yTSy “ 1 ´ ||y||2 so M “
max
yP∆pt1,...,muq
p1 ´ ||y||2q. Inside the simplex, the maximum is achieved at y “ p 1
n
, . . . , 1
n
q
and is equal to 1 ´ 1
n









Interestingly, this bound cannot be improved by harnessing Theorem 3 to this case. The
reason is that the condition s ą ŝ can never hold in this kind of switching-costs matrix, and
requires inequality of some kind in the costs (see, for example, Example 2 and Figure 4).
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Observation 1. When switching costs are uniform (sij “ 1 for i ‰ j and 0 otherwise), the
condition s ą ŝ from Theorem 3 never holds.
Proof In this case, we can compute s and ŝ directly. Following Eq. (12), s “ 1 ´ ||y˚||2
and by definition, ŝ “ 2p1´ȳ ¨y˚q.8 The condition s ą ŝ from Theorem 3 becomes 1´||y˚||2 ą
2p1 ´ ȳ ¨ y˚q or equivalently p2ȳ ´ y˚q ¨ y˚ ą 1.
However, the maximum of the function p2ȳ ´ xq ¨ x (over all Rn) is at x “ ȳ, and is equal
to ||ȳ||2 “ 1. Thus, p2ȳ ´ y˚q ¨ y˚ ď 1 and the desired inequality never holds.
4 Static Strategies in Stochastic Games
So far, we have compared the values guaranteed by stationary and static strategies in a
particular class of games resulting from adding switching costs to normal-form repeated
games. In this section, we consider general stochastic games and study which game structure
is needed for our results (or similar) to hold. Naturally, we cannot consider the most general
stochastic games and must at least assume that the same set of actions is available to the
players in each state; otherwise, static strategies are not well defined.
Let Γ be a stochastic game. We denote by S the finite set of states when I and J
are finite action sets of Player 1 and Player 2 (resp.). The transition function is denoted
by q : S ˆ I ˆ J Ñ ∆pSq and the normalized payoff function for Player 1 (zero-sum) by
r : S ˆ I ˆ J Ñ r0, 1s. We assume that the normalization is tight: min
s,i,j
rps, i, jq “ 0 and
max
s,i,j
rps, i, jq “ 1.
As before, a stationary strategy is a strategy that depends at each t on the state, but
not on the rest of the history or on t itself. We denote by Σ the set of stationary strategies
for Player 1, and by T the set of stationary strategies for Player 2. A static strategy is a
strategy that dictates the same mixed action in each stage, independent of t or the history.
We denote by Σf the set of static strategies for Player 1, and by Tf the set of static strategies
for Player 2.
Without additional requirements, limiting Player 2 to static strategies can be arbitrarily
bad for him, as the following example shows:
Example 6. An arbitrarily bad payoff in static strategies relative to stationary strategies.
Consider the following three-state stochastic game. For simplicity, Player 1 has only one
action and has no role in the game. Arrows represent the deterministic transitions, so sR is
an absorbing state:













1 ö, 1 ö
¯
It is clear that the optimal strategy for Player 2 is the stationary strategy that plays R
at SL and L at SM , since it guarantees him the minimal payoff in this game. By contrast,
let us consider a static strategy that plays L with probability x (and R otherwise). If x ă 1,
then every trajectory eventually reaches state sR where the payoff is 1, whereas if x “ 1, the
game remains in sL and the payoff is 1. It follows that the difference between the two values
is equal to the maximum difference in payoff. ♦
We therefore consider only stochastic games where only Player 2 controls the states and
the states correspond to the previously played action. Hence, S “ J and every transition
satisfies
@ps, i, jq P S ˆ I ˆ J, qps, i, jq “ δj .
Informally, the state at stage t ` 1 is the action played by Player 2 at stage t. This class of
games is denoted by G. Moreover, we denote by GS the set of games in G such that there
exist two matrices A of size |I| ˆ |J |, and S of size |J | ˆ |J | such that
@pj1, i, jq P S ˆ I ˆ J, rpj1, i, jq “ Ai,j ` Sj1,j.
Thus, Sections 2 and 3 dealt only with games from GS (with the additional constraints
sij ě 0 and sii “ 0). In Example 7 we show that indeed G ‰ GS . The following characteri-
zation of GS can be used to see whether a game in G is indeed in GS and how to construct
the appropriate matrices A and S. The intuition behind this result is that there must be no
interaction between the actions of the maximizing player and the states.
Proposition 8. Let Γ be in G, then Γ is in GS if and only if
@i, i1 P I, @j, j1, j2 P J, rpj1, i, jq ´ rpj2, i, jq “ rpj1, i1, jq ´ rpj2, i1, jq. (14)
Proof Let us first check that if Γ is in GS, then it satisfies the equation. Let i P I and
j, j1, j2 P J , then
rpj1, i, jq ´ rpj2, i, jq “ pAij ` Sj1jq ´ pAij ` Sj2jq “ Sj1j ´ Sj2j .
Hence, it is independent of i and therefore for two actions i and i1 of Player 1, the two
differences are equal.
Let us now prove the converse. Let r be a payoff function of a stochastic game in G that
satisfies
@i, i1 P I, @j, j1, j2 P J, rpj1, i, jq ´ rpj2, i, jq “ rpj1, i1, jq ´ rpj2, i1, jq.
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Fix i0 P I, j0 P J . Define for every j P J and for every j
1 P J ,
Sjj1 “ rpj
1, i0, jq ´ rpj0, i0, jq.
Notice that Sjj0 “ 0 for every j P J . Moreover for every pj
1, i, jq P S ˆ I ˆ J , let
Bijj1 “ rpj
1, i, jq ´ Sjj1 “ rpj
1, i, jq ´ rpj1, i0, jq ` rpj0, i0, jq.
To conclude, we need to check that Bijj1 does not depend on j
1 and is therefore equal to









“ rrpj10, i, jq ´ rpj
1
0, i0, jq ` rpj0, i0, jqs ´ rrpj
1
1, i, jq ´ rpj
1
1, i0, jq ` rpj0, i0, jqs
“ rrpj10, i, jq ´ rpj
1
1, i, jqs ´ rrpj
1
0, i0, jq ´ rpj
1
1, i0, jqs ` rrpj0, i0, jq ´ rpj0, i0, jqs
“ 0.
Hence the result.
Given a game Γ in G, a pair of stationary strategies pσ, τq P Σ ˆ T , and an initial state
s P S, we define

















which is the minimax value of Player 2 when using stationary strategies. Note that the








which is the minimax value of Player 2 when Player 2 is restricted to static strategies. Note
that in this case, even when Player 2 uses a static strategy, the best response of Player 1
might be stationary and not static.
Example 7. A stochastic game where the best response of Player 1 to a static strategy of
Player 2 is not static
Consider the following two-state stochastic game
sL :
˜
1 ö 0 Ñ




1 Ð 1 ö
0 Ð 1 ö
¸
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and suppose that Player 2 plays the static non-pure action rxpLq, 1 ´ xpLqs for x P p0, 1q.
The expected payoff of T in state sL is x ă 1 and the expected payoff of B in state sR is
1´x ă 1. Hence, each of these actions is dominated by the other action in the state and the
best response for Player 1 is to play B in state sL and T in state sR, with an overall payoff
of 1. Any static strategy by Player 1 would result in a payoff strictly smaller than 1 (which
is worse for him, as the maximizer).
In the model presented in Section 2, the best response to a static strategy is static. Since
that is not true here, this example shows that G ‰ GS and that the payoff function of this
game cannot be written as two additive payoffs, one corresponding to a normal-form game
and another to the switching costs (see also Proposition 8). ♦
Our main result generalizes Proposition 4 for the games in G, rather than just in GS .
Theorem 5. Fix Γ P G. The minimax value ṽΓ Player 2 can guarantee in static strategies
is at least a quarter of the value vΓ he can guarantee in stationary ones:
ṽΓ ´ vΓ ď ∆Γ “
3
4
p1 ´ vΓq. (15)







Proof Let vΓ be the value of the game (in stationary strategies). There exists a state
j˚ P S and a mixed action y˚ P ∆pJq such that for all i P I we have rpj˚, i, y˚q ď vΓ
(otherwise, the payoff of Player 1 in each state can exceed vΓ, as can the total value).
Consider the static strategy τf of Player 2, who with probability 0.5 chooses action j
˚ and
otherwise chooses an action according to mixed action y˚. The payoff of this strategy against
the stationary strategy σpsq of Player 1 is
1
4
rpj˚, σpj˚q, y˚q ` 1
4























Therefore, we obtain by subtracting vΓ on both sides that












The gain obtained by a static strategy (compared to the maximal payoff 1) is at least 1
4
of
the gain obtained by a stationary strategy.
To finalize the proof, we use an example to show that this bound is indeed tight. Suppose
J “ t0, . . . , 4u, I “ t1u and the payoff function is 1, except for rpi, 1, i ` 1q “ 0 and
rp4, 0, 1q “ 0. The optimal stationary strategy is to choose in state i action i` 1 (modulo 5)
with vΓ “ 0. Let σf be a static strategy that chooses action i with probability xi. Then the
payoff is 1 ´ x0x1 ´ x1x2 ´ . . . ´ x4x0 and it is straightforward to verify that the minimum
of this function in domain xi ě 0 and
4ř
i“0




The above result gives a tight bound on the static value compared to the stationary value,
as well as offering a strategy that attains it in some cases. For specific games, the bound
can be tighter and the optimal static strategy can be different. A particular set of games
where the bound is different are games where |J | ď 4. In this case, the difference between
the values is at most ∆Γ “
´
1 ´ 1|J |
¯
p1´ vΓq provided that Player 2 can guarantee to pay at
most vΓ in each state as a one-shot game. This is why the example in the proof of Theorem 5
has 5 actions.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we analyze zero-sum games with switching costs and compare the value under
optimal strategies (that are stationary) to an approximate solution with time-independent
strategies (“static strategies”). Our main findings are summarized in a series of theorems
which provide bounds on the difference between the two types of strategies for different
scenarios and under various assumptions. Our bounds can be used to assess whether the
additional computational complexity is worth the extra payoff gain or, symmetrically, assess
the price of playing sub-optimal but simple strategies when stationary ones are forbidden.
In addition, we study and fully characterize the value in stationary strategies as a function
of the ratio between switching costs and stage payoff (c). Our key finding is that this function,
vpcq, is piece-wise linear. This implies that the solutions are robust in the sense that an
optimal stationary strategy for a particular c is also optimal for all the cs in its segment.
Hence, knowing the exact value of c is not essential to play optimally and the strategy should
not be changed in response to small changes in c.
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We generalize our work on repeated games to compare static and stationary strategies for
general stochastic games. This generalization allows us to consider a wider range of games
with more elaborate switching-cost structures. Still, we are able to propose a bound on the
price of being history-dependent. This generalization is unique to our paper, and considers
the widest possible set of repeated zero-sum games to which the comparison between history-
dependent and stationary strategies is applicable.
Our analysis can serve as a basis for future work regarding non-zero-sum games since,
when only one player’s payoffs are considered, vpcq is his minimax value. We therefore
portray the behavior of the individually rational payoffs of the players, which serves as a
lower bound for the possible equilibrium payoff via a version of a Folk Theorem suitable for
this model. A particularly interesting model is that where switching costs paid to a “bank”
are added to a zero-sum stage game. The addition of switching costs transforms the game
into a non-zero-sum game and facilitates cooperation in an otherwise zero-sum game.
Other possible extensions are games where the switching costs depend on the outcome
of the previous round and not only on the action played. For example, Wang et al. [2014]
report that when playing rock-paper-scissors, players tend to repeat an action that led to a
victory. This can be modeled theoretically as a switching cost added to all the other actions.
Although the model is significantly different, some of the techniques and observations of this
paper might be useful in its analysis. This and the above non-zero-sum models are left for
future research.
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A Average Cost Optimality Equation (ACOE)
In this Appendix we show how the value of the game and the optimal stationary strategies
can be computed using the Average Cost Optimality Equation. We achieve this by solving
Example 1 in detail. More about these methods can be found in Arapostathis et al. [1993],
the references within, and similar papers.
In general terms, the algorithm consists of the following steps:
1. “Guess” a stationary strategy for Player 2. Based on the ideas of Proposition 1, this
stationary strategy should in each state play a mixed action that keeps Player 1 in-
different among several of his actions and makes him prefer them over the rest in the
one-shot game A. This well defines the set of actions to consider and ensures that the
algorithm eventually terminates.
2. Player 1 does not control transitions, so once the strategy of Player 2 is determined,
he can best respond by myopically best responding in each state. This can be achieved
even by pure actions. Fix such a best response.
3. Let qij be the probability of Player 2 playing action j in state si, let ri be the value
of one-shot game A when the players use their mixed actions chosen for state si, let
vi be the continuation payoff of the repeated game starting from state si and let γ be
the value of the game (Eq.(1)). The ACOE connects these variables in the following
manner:







where sij is an element in the matrix S.
4. The above equation actually represents n linear equations (one for each state) with
n ` 1 variables: γ and the vis. W.l.o.g. set v1 “ 0 and solve the remaining equations
to obtain the value of the game γ and the continuation payoffs vi.
5. Find the real mixed actions of Player 1. To do so, treat each state as a one-shot game
by writing the switching costs and the continuation payoffs in the payoff matrix. Check
that Player 1 has a best response to Player 2’s action in this game that keeps Player 2
indifferent among the actions he plays and makes him prefer them over all other actions.
6. If it is possible to find such a strategy for Player 1, this pair of strategies is optimal
and γ is the value of the game. Otherwise, restart the algorithm with another guess.
38













. Without switching costs (c “ 0), the optimal strategy for Player 2 is
1
11
p6, 3, 2q and the value is v “ 6
11
. For clarity, we denote the actions of Player 2 as L (left),
M (middle) and R (right), and the state after action i P tL,M,Ru was played by si.
Suppose that Player 2 plays 1
11
p6, 3, 2q in all states. This makes Player 1 indifferent among
all his actions, and we can assume that the best response is simply playing the first row. This
results in ri “
6
11
and pqiL, qiM , qiRq “
1
11
p6, 3, 2q for all i. The three ACOE equations are





















































Our final step is to add these continuation payoffs to the payoff matrix of each state and find


















































In game sL, solving the standard equation of indifference leads to a mixed strategy in which
Player 1 plays his actions (from top to bottom) with probabilities 1
121
p72c`66, 33´41c, 22´
31cq (and similar solutions for the other states). This mixed action is indeed a distribution
for c ď 22
31






For c ą 22
31
, action R in state sL becomes dominated and Player 1 cannot keep Player 2
indifferent between it and the other actions. We therefore assume Player 2 never plays action
R in state sL. As a result, Player 1 will never play his bottom action in sL and the new guess
for a mixed action for Player 2 in state sL is
1
3
p2, 1, 0q. In the rest of the states, action R is
not dominated so Player 2 continues to play mixed action 1
11
p6, 3, 2q in them.
Repeating the same process with this strategy (which is not static this time) leads to the
next critical value of c “ 121
156
. Above it, action M in state sL (including, again, continuation
payoffs and switching costs) is dominated by L and so sL becomes absorbing.
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